A caveat is removed by court order if there is no basis for the claim made or if the caveat has no substance (i.e. lacks the prescribed particulars).
But is it all over when the Court orders the caveat be removed?
In two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the Court ordered that the caveat be removed. But that was not the end of the matter. The Court took a broader view and made further orders to try to reduce further conflicts between the parties.
This is an analysis of the decisions. But first, let us examine the legal requirements for caveats.
Legal requirements for caveats
Real Property Act 1900 (NSW)
Section 74F
(1) Any person who … claims to be entitled to a legal or equitable estate or interest in land … may lodge with the Registrar-General a caveat prohibiting the recording of any dealing affecting the estate or interest to which the person claims to be entitled.
(5) A caveat lodged under this section must—
(b) specify the following—
(v) the prescribed particulars of the legal or equitable estate or interest … to which the caveator claims to be entitled ...
Section 74K
(2) … on the hearing of an application made [to extend the operation of a caveat] … the Supreme Court may, if satisfied that the caveator's claim has or may have substance, make an order extending the operation of the caveat … but, if that Court is not so satisfied, it shall dismiss the application.
Real Property Regulation 2019 (NSW)
Schedule 2 Particulars of estate or interest to be specified in caveats
3 If the caveator’s claim is based (wholly or in part) on the terms of a written agreement or other instrument, particulars of the nature and date of that agreement or instrument and the parties to it.
4 If the caveator claims as mortgagee, chargee or covenant chargee, a statement of the amount (if readily ascertainable) of the debt or other sum of money charged on the land …
Application to remove caveat – Al-Jaradat v Ghunmat [2025] NSWSC 1283
A caveat was lodged by the husband (Ghunmat) over a property at Strathfield jointly owned with the former wife (Al-Jaradat).
This interest was claimed:
Estate in Fee Simple
By virtue of: Agreement Between LAITH MOHAMMAD OTHMAN GHUNMAT And AHLAM NAYEF MAHOUD AL-JARADAT
Details supporting the claim: Equitable interest; Registered Proprietor holding 50% share on trust for caveator as agreed at time of purchase.
The background circumstances were that the husband and wife had separated and entered in a financial agreement to settle their property and financial affairs on 15 June 2025.
The agreement contained a procedure for the sale of their property at Strathfield, which included a process for selection of a real estate agent and for the list price to be agreed. The order of payment of the proceeds of sale was: after repayment of the bank loan and expenses of sale, payment to the wife on account of the Settlement Sum, and any surplus paid to the husband.
The wife disregarded the process and was about to enter into a contract for the sale of the property at Strathfield. The husband said the sale price was at an undervalue (which reduced the surplus he was to receive).
The husband lodged the caveat to protect his interest.
The wife made an urgent application to the Court to remove the caveat, as she needed the proceeds of sale to settle the purchase of another property at Roselands. The husband applied to extend the operation of the caveat.
His Honour Justice Slattery decided (on 30 October 2025) to order the removal of the caveat, because:
“the caveat suffers from a material misdescription of substance. The defect cannot be remedied by s 74L”
He found that:
[No basis] “The caveat claims an estate in fee simple, contradicting that the details supporting the claim that assert "an equitable interest".” [at p 27]
[No substance] “The details supporting the claim do not resolve whether the “50% share on trust for the caveator as agreed at the time of purchase” represents a written agreement, an oral agreement or an agreement implied by conduct, or whether the trust concerned is express, constructive or resulting.” [at p 29, 31]
He gave these reasons:
“The applicable legal principles are well-established. Where removal of a caveat is sought and a counter-claim for its extension is made, the Court must be satisfied under Real Property Act 1900, s 74K(2) that "the caveator's claim has or may have substance". If the Court is not so satisfied, then the Court must dismiss the application for extension of the caveat: Sutherland v Vale [2008] NSWSC 759 at [10]-[12].” [at p 24]
“A central concept of the Real Property Act and regulations is that "the nature of the estate or interest claimed" by the caveator under the Real Property Regulations must be fully and precisely articulated, as was explained by Brereton J in Sutherland v Vale at [12].” [at p 25]
“… if the caveat claims a different estate or interest than that asserted on the hearing of the application to extend the caveat or fails to give sufficient particulars of the estate of interest, then s 74L is not available to save it” [at p 26]
The Court made further orders in the exercise of its discretion.
The Court imposed conditions on the order for removal of the caveat, which included:
- If the wife proceeds with the sale of the Strathfield property to purchase the Roselands property (as foreshadowed) then the husband either be given security over the Roselands property (immediately after any first mortgage finance) or there be a quarantining of a portion of the proceeds of sale sufficient to compensate the husband for the amount in the valuation dispute and likely legal costs.
- A procedure to settle the valuation dispute for the Strathfield property.
- An expedited assessment of the wife’s legal costs in the proceedings, by the Court.
Application for extension of caveat – Di Liristi v Shahata [2025] NSWSC 1325
The lessee (Di Liristi) leased a rural property from the lessor (Shahata).
The lessee had defaulted in payment of rent, and the lessor was pursuing proceedings for the termination of the lease and for possession. The lessee defended the proceedings claiming that he was entitled to remain in possession by virtue of the substantial improvements he had made on the property.
This interest was claimed:
Estate In Fee Simple
By virtue of: Adverse Possession
Details Supporting the Claim: Arising from construction of buildings and improvements which now attach to the land.
His Honour Justice Slattery decided (on 31 October 2025) to strike out the caveat, because:
“The caveat’s claim of an estate in fee simple is quite different in substance from the plaintiff’s true claim of holding a nine-year equitable lease by estoppel. And the plaintiff’s claim of an estate by adverse possession is quite different in substance from the plaintiff’s true claim of having the registered proprietor’s consent to a longer lease than was first granted to him. The caveat cannot be extended, and the Court will therefore strike it out with costs.” [p 18]
The Court gave leave to the lessee to file an amended statement of claim pleading relief in the proceedings by way of proprietary estoppel or any other relief he claims.
Comments
In both cases the caveat was removed/struck out.
In both cases the Court exercised its discretion to make further orders to try to reduce further conflicts between the parties.
In both cases, legal costs were awarded against the party who had lodged the caveat.